INTRODUCTION
On the eve of independence from European colonialism, Egypt, like most other developing countries, undertook the project of de-linking itself from colonial economy by initiating domestic industrialization. 1 The economic project known as Import Substitution Industrialization ("ISI") 2 was designed to liberate Egypt from raw commodity production-specifically, agricultural and mineral-servicing its previous colonial master, Great Britain. 3 The engine of development would be an expanding public sector with nationalization and socialism as leitmotifs. 4 In re-orienting the economy towards industrial production, Egypt hoped that the terms of trade with the international economy would significantly improve, thereby leading to an improvement in the living standards of its population. 5 And, like most other developing countries (with Essentially, the transition from an ISI-based economy driven by a public sector to the market-based economy meant a transition from the relatively blurred class map of the public-sector-driven developing economy to a more differentiated one.
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The transition also meant that those tasks/ideologies/institutions associated with the public sector-growth, distribution, nationalism, socialism, populism, corporatism-had to be unbundled and given up. 19 As they were unbundled and became associated with the social forces of the new class map, both rising ones and declining ones, they took on new incarnations making them shadows of their previous selves. 20 The Egyptian story of transition is complicated by the fact that Egypt receives "rent" from three strategic sources: the Suez Canal, oil and natural gas, and geo-political location (U.S. aid). 21 Since both the Suez Canal and oil and natural gas are administered by public companies, the revenues reach the coffers of the state directly. 22 Revenues from these sources are rent in that while they deploy a minimal amount of local labor, they potentially yield large revenue. 23 While the amount of this revenue could be sizable, it could also be fragile. 24 Forces outside of Egypt's control, such as the international market or Egypt's geopolitical value to the United States, determine the amount of 25 revenue.
Although Egypt's rent revenue is not comparable in size to that of the oil 26 producing countries of the Gulf region, its intermittent availability in sizable amounts triggers a dynamic that approximates that of rent societies. Elites are dependent on rent revenue to preserve their hold on power through allocative activities while "rentiered" beneficiaries offer passive political loyalty in return. 27 Rent surplus makes the state elite relatively autonomous by providing economic benefits to social groups that otherwise might challenge existing structures. 28 Therefore, rentierism enters the dynamic of transition from ISI to the market in Egypt contributing its own dynamic, itself determined by the rise and fall of rent revenue. This adds to the story of transition another layer of complexity that needs to be captured.
Another layer of complexity is what I call the "Islamic Sector." While the condensation of growth/distribution/political power within the public sector of ISI yielded the social forces undergoing "privatization,"
29 it also constituted the social forces outside it through exclusion. Islamist ideology, in moderate or radical form, found a home within social groups existing "autonomously from the state"; 30 they were either never beneficiaries of the public sector, or they came to the social force through the rent economy occurring outside the public sector, fed by worker remittances, or were children of those who benefited from the public sector but found themselves excluded from it due to 24 EGYPT, 1960 EGYPT, -1990 EGYPT, , at 40-46, 53 (1995 . 25 Id. Moreover, Egypt is located within an oil-rich region that finds itself the periodic overseer of petrodollars searching for labor and investment opportunities. This has allowed Egypt to export its labor to these countries utilizing their remittances at opportune moments of its economic history as a source of badly needed hard currency. In the same vein, foreign investment has often meant for Egypt petrodollar money from the Gulf countries looking to invest in Egypt. Id. 26 In 2007, Egypt produced on average 665.08 thousand barrels of oil a day, ranking it twenty-seventh among world producers. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Data and Analysis for Egypt, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/countryenergydata.cfm?fips=EG (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). The same year, the natural gas production of 1,501 billion cubic feet made it the nineteenth biggest producer. Id.
GALAL AMIN, EGYPT'S EcoNOMIc PREDICAMENT: A STUDY IN THE INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL PRESSURE, POLITICAL FOLLY, AND SOCIAL TENSION IN
27 Beblawi, supra note 23, at 53. 28 See AYUBI, supra note 11, at 234-35. 29 See id. 30 In Egypt, "the main mobilization against the state bourgeoisie and its authoritarian apparatus has so far not come from the economic private sector but rather from the 'socio-cultural' private sector: From the radical Islamic movements and from the informal so-called 'Islamic business' groups with alternative network of schools, hospitals and social services." AYuBI, supra note 11, at 408.
[Vol. 23 the transition to the market. 31 While most other social forces live out the drama of their exclusion from the public sector, the Islamic Sector sees itself as the alternative to the state, not in the form of private sector replacing public sector, but a kind of alternative parallel state. 32 But because it was constituted through exclusion by the ISI public sector, it lives in the shadow of the state: mimicking its discourses, tools, and institutions; engaging with it; and conspiring to annex it.
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In the transition from ISI to market, law played an important role. Just as the elites of Egypt received globalized ideas about the economy-first in the form of ISI as a response to the colonial economic legacy, globalized among postcolonial elites, and later on the Washington Consensus of International Finance Institutions, globalized in the form of an imposition on state elites as a response to the failure of ISI-so did legal elites receive globalized ideas about law that they too needed to contend with. 35 Egyptian jurists received the "social" in law during the ISI era, 36 and during the later neo-liberal era they were influenced by American-style constitutionalism, where rights were married to the market (reasoned in neo-formalist 37 (showing how the court uses a constitutional provision to deduce a new basis for discrimination through analogy, which it treats as unconstitutional, a hallmark of formalist reasoning).
Legal rules serviced both economic strategies, ISI and subsequently the market, in that a set of rules and legal institutions had to be put in place to implement each economic mode in turn.
Not only is law used by elites to "implement" an economic strategy and interpreted by judges in "the spirit of the times," it is also deployed among the contending social forces of the transition. 41 For the purposes of improving the bargaining power of one side at the expense of the other, law is used in the form of a proposed constitutional amendment here or a legislative reform 42 there. State elites pass constitutional amendments that tighten their grip on the politics of transition; market-oriented reformists propose a clearer separation of powers, married to the market as an improvement of their own bargaining power vis-A-vis the state elites; the working class agitates for the capacity to unionize independently from the state to improve its bargaining position both vis-A-vis the state elites and the new market with the hope of improving its declining living standards resulting from the transition to All Egyptian constitutions stress the principle of equality and treat it as the basis for justice freedom and social peace. ... However, these particular bases of discrimination are enumerated in the constitution by virtue of their commonality, but the list is not limited to them. .... [E] ven though the list is limited it includes every aspect of differentiation, restriction, preference.... That this law privileges doctors over other lessees despite the fact that they share the same legal status, and without objective basis, renders the law unconstitutional.
Id. (translation by author).
38 See id for an example of the use of the post-realist mode of American reasoning noting the recurring use in the Court's language of "balancing" and "weighing:"
While it is permissible for a legislator in a state that combines individual freedom with state intervention to restrict use of property by the holder for a social purpose, this restriction however does not occur in a vacuum nor should it be conducted arbitrarily. The nature of the right itself, the purpose of this restriction, and the social circumstances under which this restriction takes place should all be taken into consideration. In this context, the legislator weighs the alternatives and chooses the interests most worthy of protection. ... Right of property should therefore be regulated in a manner that balances interests.... Lessor and lessee should combine their interests in a manner that promotes economic development The balance between them should not weigh in favor of one at the expense of the other; otherwise it would lead to injustice. It is hard to imagine that the exploited of yesterday has become the exploiter of today as a result of the skewed balance through legislative intervention to its favor. [Vol. 23 market. 43 And the Islamic Sector uses the courts to pass off its Islamicization agenda in the face of a highly secularized, post-ISI state.
Id. (translation by author) (emphasis added
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This paper is an attempt to describe this drama of transition from within the tradition of political economy that combines the study of the economy with that of the social forces and political systems constituted by and interacting with economic regimes. It starts with a historical review of economic/political phenomena prevailing in Egypt, beginning with the regime of Nasser and ending with that of Mubarak. After inserting the Islamic Sector into the drama, the paper continues with describing how law is used for each orientation and its actor. It finishes by describing four strategies for the state elite to remain in power. It is a description with an underlying normative agenda. It tries to describe the situation in a way that (hopefully) leads the reader to ask the following two questions: First, what is the response, indeed alternative to the Washington Consensus as a response to the failure of ISI; and second, which social force in the context of Egypt is most likely to produce this alternative?
I. HISTORICAL REVIEW
A. The Nasser Era (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) Nasser initiated ISI as soon as he came to power in 1952. 45 Rather than promote industrialization through regulatory and macroeconomic measures favoring domestic private industry, as occurred in the East Asian Tigers, Nasser engineered the creation of a big public sector charged with the task of 46 promoting full industrialization. Nasser responded to the massive popular demand for economic reform by passing a series of special legislations that took their base in land reforms. 47 These were meant to remove the resource base of Egypt's previous land elite, to redistribute rural assets, and to be an incentive for previous landowners with economic means to invest in industry. TRANsNAT'L L. 1043 (2004) ("An example of Islamist Sector advancing its views through the legal system can be displayed by the practice of adherence to strict Islamic law for family law issues, whereas, the remainder of law in Egypt is largely secular.").
45 WATERBURY, supra note 1, at 60.
In addition to being the locus of industrial oriented economic growth (ISI), an oversized public sector 4 9 came to serve two purposes for the regime of Nasser. First, it was the locus of resource transfer from the countryside to the city, 50 distributed through price controls and job creation 51 (ISI + socialism + populism); and second, it was the vehicle for the emergence of state elites (the new authoritarians). In exchange for employment and social benefits offered by the state, Nasser corporatized 53 the political (corporatist populism). 54 Each social group had its corporate entity that represented its interests and was part of the state. 5 Thus, in the nationalization process, the objective was not restricted to property but also included social movements, associations, and 56 syndicates.
The 52 AYUBI, supra note 11, at 277. During an initial stage of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes, the demands of the "popular classes" are to some degree met. But after a "ceiling" is reached, a new "alliance between the military-technocracy and the upper bourgeoisie in cooperation with (subordination to) international capital" is reached and seeks to constrain the demands of the popular classes by exclusionary measures. Id 53 In corporatism, "[t]he tendency is to move downward through the re-stratification of the public into corporate functional groupings relevant to development and system-maintenance. Not class, but corporate grouping, is characteristic: hence a kind of 'corporate representation' in primary stage modernizing, mobilization systems is seen as the means of reconciling populism with functional expertise." DAvID APTER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND POSTMODERN POLITICS, 148-49 (1987) , quoted in AyuBi, supra note 11, at 207. 54 AYUBI, supra note 11, at 207-08. In its early stages, the public-sector-based development achieved high rates of economic growth. 59 However, this quickly changed for reasons related to the nature of the economic tasks undertaken: overambitious developmental programs not matched by local capacity; distribution considerations taking precedence over growth ones; 6 0 the fragmentation of the public sector into "bureaucratic factions, clientelist networks and personalist cliques"; 61 reasons related to international politics; 62 and regional politics.
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The political possibilities of salvaging ISI were blocked by Nasser's attack on the forces of 64 the opposition from the left and the right.
Those who refused to be "corporatized" were put in jail.
65 Sadat came to power in 1970, 66 inheriting a country heavily indebted as a result of its post-war reconstruction efforts.
B. The Sadat Era (1970-1981)
By the time he was assassinated in 1981, 67 Sadat left the following legacy: (1) he entered a war with Israel in 1973 (in alliance with Syria) in which the Egyptian army performed spectacularly well, gaining a great deal of political legitimacy for Sadat in its aftermath;
68 (2) favoring socialism and promoted those favoring "opening up the economy"; 69 (3) he facilitated the return of landowners to the countryside and the reconsolidation of their economic power through the relaxation of land reforms initiated by Nasser; 7° (4) he initiated market reforms in what came to be called the "Open Door Policy," primarily oriented towards liberalizing trade and encouraging "foreign Arab investment"; 71 and (5) he unleashed the forces of the religious right in an attempt to marginalize the left as part of his agenda of transition to market.
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The beginning of the rise in oil prices in 1975 heralded Egypt's entry into the dynamics of a rentier economy.
7 3 Rent revenue entered the coffers of the state through publicly owned oil and natural gas companies.
74 Given Egypt's location in a region that was receiving a rent windfall and was, therefore, labor starved, Egypt conveniently exported a good part of its labor force. 75 Labor remittances became a feature of the Egyptian GNP landscape. 76 However, an economic orientation was already in place by the time the rent windfall settled. The transition to market ("Open Door Policy") initiated by Sadat was mostly a "market" in its orientation towards trade liberalization.
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The Soviet military mission was ended in 1971, and Sadat purged the figures that were pro-Soviet in the regime, attempting liberalization. ZAALouK, supra note 34, at 57.
70 A policy of de-sequestration was implemented by which land was to return to its rightful owners. ANSARI, supra note 57, at 172-84. All sequestrations that occurred in 1961-64 were annulled; former owners were granted full restoration of the property or full economic compensation; third parties who had benefited or received property through the sequestration were taken into consideration. Id. Just as under Nasser, the sequestration policies coincided with political ambitions and security concerns, the laws on de-sequestration mirrored Sadat's crackdown on opposition forces. Id. Depending on the time and reason for sequestration, different laws of compensation applied. Id.
71 The Open Door Policy prioritized export related projects and was meant to bring in advanced technology and enhance Egypt's strategic position: foreign investors could now take majority interests in some firms that had been reserved for the public sector monopoly of banking; Arab investment was granted special privileges to attract Arab petrodollars; any project approved within its terms would automatically be considered part of the private sector; forty-nine percent of all equity in public sector firms was to be put up for private subscription; and weak companies would be sold off or liquidated, while strong ones would be put up for general share subscriptions. WATERBURY, supra note 1, at 131-39. Private investment projects were not subject to labor laws, stipulations of worker representation on management boards, profit-sharing formulas, and salary ceilings applied to the public sector. Id. 
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In other words, the transition to market at that period included trade liberalization without the privatization of public sector companies. JXL4m, supra note 7, at 18. While Sadat's Open Door Policy set the tone for forthcoming privatization, actual legal steps for privatization did not occur until the 1990s. Id. This ultimately aggravated the balance-of-payment deficit inherited from the Nasser era as external debt was used to foot the import bill. 79 Thus, rentierism arrived as Nasser's ISI was liberalized through trade only. Its advent reinforced already existing patterns in the economy (orientation in imports/exports, investment, and output). 8° However, the sectors that were fed the rent revenue (same as the ones that expanded through trade liberalization) had limited employment creation potential. 81 Furthermore, the employment that was created was contingent on the availability of rent (services and 82 housing sectors), and given that Nasser's ISI public sector (with the exception of the mineral industry) remained in decline, social conflict was not far afield. 83 The export of labor to the oil-rich Gulf region averted such a conflict while the patterns of (non-)production in the economy remained the same. 84 In other words, while social conflict was averted, the dynamics of wealth disparity were in motion and waiting to tighten their grip once the rent depleted. Indeed, this is what happened beginning in the mid-eighties when the decline in oil prices and the recession in the Gulf region drove Egyptian 85 labor migrants back home.
Despite the plentiful availability of foreign exchange during this period, Egypt's debt was compounded with a notable increase in state expenditure.
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C. The Mubarak Era (1981-present)
Sadat's economic legacies to Mubarak were twofold: (1) a much bigger external debt, 87 and (2) a more distorted economic structure, with the rent economy surpassing that of the productive economy, whether agricultural or industrial. These severe structural deficiencies in the economy drove the country to the precipice with the collapse of oil prices in 1986.89 Decline in the productive economy meant that the post-ISI elites were unable to provide jobs to those whose fate was undermined by the decline in the rent economy and that the income from these sectors was unable to replace the hard currency income lost in the rent economy. 90 However, to preserve its hold on power and buy social peace, the regime could not decrease public expenditure to absorb what it could of those driven to unemployment.
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The crisis drove Egypt to sign an economic reform agreement with the IMF in May 1987, according to which the government agreed to reduce expenditures, liquidate all losing public companies, and liberalize the Egyptian pound relative to the dollar to attract expatriate savings, especially from the Gulf. 92 It also undertook to raise interest rates to encourage savings and curb consumerism. 93 Following the agreement with the IMF, the Egyptian regime went to the Paris Club and got consent to reschedule its external debt.
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Egypt's situation was greatly improved when the United States sought an international coalition in 1990 to roll back Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 95 In return for Egypt's support for the U.S. war, creditor countries agreed to cancel half of Egypt's debts, though they made this promise contingent upon Egypt carrying out economic reforms. However, the structural dependence of the state elites on huge governmental expenditures to stay in power means that Egypt's capacity to reduce governmental expenditure is limited. When it succeeds in reducing the budget deficit, it is usually not the result of a decrease in governmental expenditure but of an increase in revenues due to international factors. 1 0 3 In other words, in the patronage-based authoritarian system of the regime, the elites depend on the political support and control that they receive in exchange for distributing benefits. This does not allow for a decrease in public expenditure.
Thus, one of the failures of the ISI model is that it has produced state elites that are path-dependent in terms of their public expenditure patterns to stay in power and have intermittent access to surplus revenues.
1 0 5 When available, surplus revenue reinforces expenditure patterns, and when depleted it drives the state into financial crises of increasing debt. This situation further reinforces the bargaining position of the IFIs in relation to these elites. Having abandoned the economic strategy of ISI and subjected the country to 98 In isolation from a rent economy, implementation of the neo-liberal program creates an economic orientation that diminishes the role of domestic industry (due to the withdrawal of the state from the economy which domestic industry is dependent upon for protection) and encourages commodity production for export (agricultural and mineral)109-both reminiscent of the colonial economy. 110 In the context of a rent economy, implementation of the neo-liberal program highlights the role of those sectors of the economy dependent on rent: tourism, oil, commerce, and services.
111 Both shifts lead to a differentiated class map in the countryside and the city. 112 The incremental implementation of neo-liberalism leads to shifts in class differentiation. The intermittent and on-going implementation of the neo-liberal program increases the popularity and hegemony of this model within Egypt and dispels any notions of the model as a solution to the economic crisis of Egypt-Egypt is always transitioning to Market.
The result is a public sector that has increased in size (through rent) but lost symbolically (the failure of ISI discredited it) leading to its neglect, and a private sector that is small in size (due to resistance) but has succeeded in monopolizing the symbolic and ideological space.
II. THREE ORIENTATIONS: A COMPARISON OF THREE POLITICAL ECONOMES
Today, Egypt has three economic orientations: (1) ISI-on-the-decline; (2) intermittent-Rentierism; and (3) Market-on-the-rise. 113 These three orientations exist in combination, each with its own peculiar features that sometimes cohere and sometimes pull in opposite directions. 
III. TIE ISLAMIC SECTOR
Although the Islamic Sector is inserted into this overall picture, it is not treated as an "economic orientation," but rather a parallel state-in-the-making. It is undermined by an ongoing repressive assault by the state elites 114 but nevertheless has an economic base, an economic ideology, a relationship to law, and forms of political representation. 115 But, it is also a parallel state that has the ambition of annexing the formal state with the intention of transforming it. Therefore, it uses its parallel existence to make various assaults on the institutions of that state. For example, it participates in the elections of the Egyptian Parliament,' 16 [Vol. 23 structures, 117 and builds fortunes in the private sector that is emerging as a result of liberalization and privatization. 118 Islamic companies and Islamic banks are the most famous representations of "Islamic capital" that sees itself as an alternative to the secular capital promoted by the state elites. 119 Notably, while Islamists have succeeded in infiltrating the corporatist structures of the middle class, like professional associations, they seem to have failed in infiltrating labor unions. 120 The urban working class seems, thus far, the most immune to Islamist influence.
117 See Demmelhuber, supra note 102, at 125. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, members of the Muslim Brotherhood won majorities or absolute majorities in the elections for the boards of the Engineers', Doctors', Lawyers', Pharmacists', and Scientists' Syndicates. Id. Although most active and present in student politics like at Cairo University, Muslim Brotherhood students have been banned from participating in student unions. 118 Successful Islamist businessmen have impeded the progress of the regime, which has moved to confiscate business assets and to prosecute successful Islamist businessmen under charges of money laundering, terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the regime. In 2007, forty businessmen and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including deputy leader Khairat al-Shatir, were tried before a military tribunal. Halawi, supra note 114. 
IV. LAW AND ADJUDICATION IN THE SHADOW OF THE THREE POLITICAL
ECONOMIES
When it comes to law, there is no doubt that legal rules are the handmaidens for the economic strategies of ISI and the Market respectively. Rentier rule also dips into legal rules.
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For the ISI-orientation, the tone was set by Nasser in 1962 with the National Charter-nationalization and socialism were the Charter's main tenants. 122 The legal structure includes rules that move the economic resources [Vol. 23
The judiciary is structured according to the needs of each economic strategy. 144 The launching of the ISI-orientation witnessed a diffusion of judicial authority in the mode of spin-off specialized tribunals.
145 Tribunals implemented special legislation (be it redistributive legislation or compensatory legislation dealing with reimbursing the losers from the transfer of resources), either as panels of final instance or as first instance courts whose judgments are appealed in regular courts.
14 6 Such judicial bodies were manned by technocrats with expertise in the particular area they were adjudicating (agricultural credit, tax law, etc.). Higher courts upheld many of the decisions of these lower courts, and the High Administrative Court treated the bulk of ISI special legislation as valid under the doctrine of "Ordre Publique." ' 147 Contrary to the ISI phenomenon of judicial proliferation from the bottom, the Market-orientation has relied for its implementation on the Supreme Constitutional Court ("SCC") 148 playing the role from the top of the judicial structure and striking down the special legislation of the ISI era. Using the pet rules of the market (contract and property located in the Egyptian Civil Code), the SCC has overturned much of what it treated as "distortive" legislation passed under ISI. 149 To do so, the SCC has marshaled the assistance of comparative constitutional jurisprudence with heavy American influence to rationalize its comprehensive intervention, reversing the two-decade-long course of adjudication by regular courts. 150 I hypothesize that dipping into comparative constitutional jurisprudence has helped the SCC subdue opposition from within the judiciary itself to the radical course of action it was pursuing.
While the special legislation of ISI brought forth a new, urbanized middle class in Egypt, the ISI corporate structures contained political dissent in the system and even eliminated the political altogether (through the mobilizing ideologies of socialism and nationalism). 151 The Market has not been so fortunate. Social conflict in the era of the neo-liberal policies could not be so contained and discontent peaked its head, bared by the eroding flesh of corporatism.
The development of the SCC in the early eighties was contemporaneous with the introduction of liberalized political forms of representation with political parties 152 and regular elections. The adoption of the constitutional jurisprudence of the US and that of other foreign countries comes from the court's belief that it has at its disposal a huge tradition of constitutional judicial review that should be made use of "Science" evolves as a result of a cumulative effort, of each benefiting from the work of others, adding to it and developing it further. [Vol. 23 allowed the system to shift the task of absorbing political dissent to these liberal structures of political representation and called upon the Court to adjudicate political conflict, now expressed in legal terms. 154 The topics of adjudication were election laws 155 and political party laws.
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While the judiciary as a social group can be seen as part of the state elites, with its lineage firmly based in the state bureaucracy, it is nevertheless autonomous in two senses: (1) an ethic of autonomy is shared among its members which constrains and conditions its subordination to the interests of the political state elites; 157 and (2) ideological influence comes to the judiciary in the language of legal discourse, which means that the judiciary's trafficking of the ideology is mediated through a legal consciousness that runs parallel to, although autonomously from, political consciousness. 158 Thus, under ISI, the judiciary adjudicated within a globalized legal consciousness of "the social," while over the course of the past thirty years the legal thought that dominated its consciousness was based on the idea of "rights," interpreted to mean economic rights such as property and contract, coupled with political rights. 159 Thus, when the SCC was asked to adjudicate political conflicts in the name of rights enumerated in the Egyptian Constitution (free speech, freedom of the press, assembly, freedom of association, education and equal opportunity, trial 154 by law, privacy, property, etc.), 16° it saw the Egyptian landscape studded with economic and political regulation, which it deemed unconstitutional. 161 The SCC treated statutes regulating political parties and elections (passed in the 1980s) that make it difficult to contest the dominance of the ruling party in the parliament 162 on par with statutes that regulate the property rights of landlords and landowners to the benefit of residential tenants and tenant farmers. 163 Similarly, the SCC treated legislation that ensured the redistribution of resources, such as education across the class structure, by requiring the rich to subsidize the education of the poor 164 on par with corporatist legislation of the ISI era that ensured representation of all social groups involved in the production process or professional practice in public companies, boards of professional associations, and labor unions. 165 In other words, by viewing all laws through the same lens, the SCC equated the legalization of authoritarian practices with that of corporatist ones and redistributive ones. 166 They were all bad because they violated several constitutional rights, such as the freedom of expression, the freedom of association, the right to property, and the right to education. 167 Moreover, the SCC took a very libertarian approach and struck down various tax programs designed to increase the state coffers when rent is depleted, in the process costing the state millions of dollars in lost revenue.168
Additionally, while the SCC decisions opened up political party contestations and allowed Islamic party candidates to run as independents, the SCC nevertheless dealt swiftly and adroitly with Islamist litigants who argued for the Islamacization of secular legislation based on Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution. 169 Procedurally, it did so by dismissing their claims or by appearing to earnestly interpret the Islamic texts. 170 It repeatedly concluded that secular legislation is indeed Islamic.
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Towards the end of the 1990s, the SCC finished dismantling both the regulatory structures of ISI (redistributive and corporatist) and that of the mono-party rule in Egypt. 172 Meanwhile, the SCC's relationship with the political elites was in crisis. It had serviced the regime's project of legalizing the political fallout from the implementation of neo-liberal policies by turning the Court, as opposed to the street, into a site of political dissent, thereby minimizing the cost of transition for the regime. 173 Yet conversely, and perhaps even perversely, the SCC increased costs for the regime in dealing with political dissent by opening up the political system to political parties of the opposition in parliament. 174 At the same time, the SCC simultaneously curried favor with human rights advocates by being a champion of civil and political rights while taking them by surprise with its extreme hostility to economic regulation. 175 Sandwiched between two ambivalences, the SCC's strategy could not be sustained. Al-Morr, the President of the SCC in the nineties, retired and was succeeded by four consecutively appointed presidents. 176 These presidents, who emerged from the bosom of the state bureaucracy, clearly identified with the interests of the regime. 177 More importantly, while the SCC consolidated its interventions in the economic sphere, its interventions of the nineties in the political sphere were almost completely reversed through the passage of constitutional amendments in March 2007. 178 Currently, neo-liberalism is in a tight constitutional embrace with mono-party rule.
V. STRATEGIES OF THE CURRENT STATE ELITES: SPLITTING OFF
Having conceded to the neo-liberal program of the IFIs, 179 the current state elites have found themselves confronting a conundrum. The implementation of the IFI-program led to the unbundling of the constellation of growth, distribution, and political power that was the feature of the public-sector-driven ISI strategy that they had incubated and that had birthed them in return. An enlarged public sector is the home of those state elites and the instrument through which they have historically exercised control over the various social groupings. The failure of this public sector to produce development and the annexation of the ideological sphere by the "market," however, has left them with little choice but to give "it" up. 180 This essentially means that the state elites stand to lose control. Therefore, they proceed by cautiously inventing various strategies aimed to turn the economy towards the market with as little loss as possible to their control. 181 I call these strategies "splitting," in the sense that tasks, powers, and privileges associated with the public sector are split off to other social groups and institutional practices. The split in each case is carefully engineered not to jeopardize those state elites' control. I identify four modes of splitting that they have pursued: (1) splitting off to the private sector; (2) splitting off to democracy; (3) splitting off to the judiciary; and (4) splitting off to distribution.
It is important to assert that there is nothing stable about these split-off strategies. They shift over time and, indeed, could be reversed depending on the consequences for the state elites. A second important assertion is that those strategies are not necessarily coherent. For example, the split-off to an autonomous judiciary could undermine a carefully designed split-off to democratic practice, when an overzealous SCC throws the former offbalance. 182 
A. The Split-Off to the Private Sector
Privatizing the public sector gives rise to private capital contending for representation of its interests within the state. The public sector historically included industrial companies, mineral extraction companies, and public companies administering services such as transportation, insurance, and banking. 183 The state elites of Egypt pursued an incremental strategy of privatization. 184 Although privatization sped up after 2004, state elites remain in control over the bulk of the national un-privatized banking system. 185 Their control over banks significantly undermines the autonomy of the private sector vis-A-vis the state. 186 The state elites also retain control by continuously shifting state support among the contending segments of the private sector: sometimes empowering the commercial trade-based capital and other times providing protection to domestic industry allied with foreign capital, only to shift and support export-oriented agribusiness. 187 When rent is available, the state elites' autonomy vis-A-vis private capital is increased; when rent is 181 depleted, the state elites turn to private capital for taxes and contributions to infrastructure projects in the various localities.
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In turn, the various segments of private capital strategize to increase their bargaining power vis-A-vis the state elites: They infiltrate the ruling National Democratic Party-home of the state elites-and run for elections under its umbrella, 189 and their intelligentsia (advocates of Market) find a foothold in the state bureaucracy through the parallel bureaucratic structures put in place by the World Bank.
19 Thus far, the new capital seems inclined to the strategy of infiltrating the state to improve the terms of negotiation with the state elites. Serious democratization does not seem to be on its agenda, as it seems inclined to get what it wants through the strategy of infiltrating contemporary political, bureaucratic, and corporatist structures. 191 
B. The Split-Off to Democratic Practice
The failure of development and the ongoing economic crisis have alerted the state elites to the following macro-political trade-off as a strategy of survival: opening up democratic practice in return for giving up part of the distributional role associated with public-sector-driven development. The rolling back of the distributional role of the public sector is now relegated to the Parliament to vote on through a series of legislation. 192 It is Parliament, not government, that could now take the blame for the ensuing immiseration.
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That is the upside of this strategy. The downside is that any opening up of democratic practice increases the power of the Islamic sector at the expense of the National Democratic Party. And given its parallel power, state elites are always inclined to reverse and restrict liberties they bestow according to this strategy. 194 188 Id. at 65-66. 189 Demmelhuber, supra note 102, at 121-22; Issandr El Amrani, Controlled Reform in Egypt: Neither
